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IK THE SUPPEMS COORT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
COUNTRYSIDE HOMEOWNER
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit
corporation,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Civil No. 20834

vs.

:

JOHN MELEHES and IRIS MELEHES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether summary judgment was appropriate in a case where
there were factual disputes concerning the interpretation of a
declaration of covenants of a condominium project, and whether
the evidence before the court consisting of a deposition of one
party, the affidavits of two parties, and the memorandum of
counsel was sufficient to demonstrate no issues of fact or law
requisite to granting a motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In November of 1983, the defendants, John and Iris Melehes,
purchased two condominium units in the Countryside Condominium
Project from Harmer Lambert, Inc., a Utah corporation, as the
developer.

These condominiums were located in Salt Lake County

at approximately 70 South and 6th East.

Prior to their purchase,

the defendants discussed with Harmer Lambert, through Rich Lloyd,
their agent, the fact that they desired to use one of the units
to operate an in-home computer billing service called Iris
Medical.

This service is a service in which the defendant Iris

Melehes does computerized billings for physicians and other

-?-

medical practitioners m

.ne area.

Permission was given by the

developers to the defendants to operate the computer in one unit
prior to the signma oi any purchase agreements and prior to the
defendants moving into the units in December of 1983.

(See

affidavit of defendant Iris Melehes attached to defendants
response to motion for summary judgment.

Record on appeal.)

The

developer even assisted in wiring one of the units so that it
would be appropriately wired for a large computer.
Following the defendants' entry into the condominium, and
after a period of time had elapsed, the defendants were notified
that pursuant to the Countryside Homeowners Agreement, (attached
to plaintiff's complaint, record on appeal) a declaration of
condominium covenants, that they were not allowed to operate a
business and that they were interfering with parking and, in
general, interfering with other tenants peaceful use of the
premises.

The defendants contested this but the parties were

unable to resolve their differences and a lawsuit was initiated
by the Homeowners Association in February of 1985.

The

defendants had lived in the unit for approximately 14 months at
that time.
Following the filing of the lawsuit, a deposition was taken
of Iris Melehes, one of the defendants herein, which is part of
the record on appeal, in which the defendant indicated that one
of the units was being used to operate her computer billing
service and that although individuals would come to the
condominium, they were not living there but defendant did, in
fact, live in the same unit where the computer was located.

(See

-J*.

deposition p.23-25 and P"! ~ *.ntif t' s Memorandum for Sunnary
Judgment, Record on Appeal, p.2-3)
After taking the deposition of Iris Melehens, the plaintiff
moved for summary judgment.

It used the statements made in the

deposition and the declaration of condominium covenants
themselves as the basis that there was no dispute. An opposing
memorandum was filed, along with an affidavit of Iris Melehes
setting forth the understanding of the defendants at the time
that they purchased the units.
The court reviewed counsel's memorandum and affidavits and
the pertinent parts of the deposition, and on July 2, 1985, Judg<
John A. Rokich ruled that there were no contested issues of fact
or law and that summary judgment was appropriate.

This ruling,

in effect, enjoined the defendants from operating their business
from their condominium unit.
the addendum)

(See injunction, attached hereto as

It is from that decision that the defendants

appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion fo:
summary judgment in that there were genuine issues of fact and
law with respect to the defendants' claim in the case. The
status of the record at the time of the summary judgment hearing
contained only a deposition of one of the defendants and an
affidavit, both of which set forth contested facts, facts which
plaintiff contends are central to the resolution of the lawsuit.
Therefore, the court was arbitrary in granting the summary
judgment without further discovery and without allowing the case

-4-

to proceed on xt% * nerits.
ARGUMENT
This Court han long taken the position that any summary
proceeding which is disposirive of a lawsuit should be viewed
with great caution so that parties whose cause might have merit
is not deprived of the right to access to the court for the
enforcement of rights or to redress wrong.
P.2d 432 (Utah, 1980).

McBride v. Jones, 615

Rule 56(c) of Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith with
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any show that
there are no genuine issues to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
This Court has recently said in the case of Gadd v. Olsen,
685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984), that a motion for summary judgment can
only be granted when there are no genuine issues as to any
material fact and even assuming the facts as asserted by the
party moved against to be true, that the party could not prevail
in some other fashion.
In this case, the plaintiff, as the Homeowners Association,
has taken the position that the only governing document that is
applicable to resolving the issue before the court is the
declaration of condominium covenants and that any representations
made to the defendants by the developer of the condominium
project, are somehow merged in that document and are not
appropriate as they are not written out in any other document.
It is clear that in this case there are two separate

transactions that must be resolved.

The first is the transaction

between the defendants and the original developer of the
property, Harmer Lambert, Inc.

Defendants contemporaneously with

their response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, also
filed a motion to interplead a third party complaint against the
developer and that motion was also granted by the court. These
actionsf however, are not mutually exclusive.

The lower court

apparently believed that the allegations contained in defendants'
answer and the defendant Iris Melehes' deposition and affidavit
that were part of the file which the court considered at the time
of the summary hearing, were insufficient to offset the actual
verbage of the homeowners agreement itself.

The court, however,

did not find that all prior discussions between the parties had
been merged into that agreement nor that the original developer
and the Melehes were privy to the homeowners agreement at the
time they consummated their transaction.
In this case, plaintiff asks for rather severe injunctive
relief.

In essence, the court's order requires that the

defendants either dismantel their computer and cease any
operations therein or move from the premises.

This is a harsh

remedy and has the potential of jeopardizing a ten year business
that defendants have built.

This Court has consistently held

that injunctive relief is an .extraordinary remedy and should not
be lightly granted.

System Concepts, Inc., v. Shirley M. Dixon,

669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983).

That is clearly not the case here.

The language of the Homeowner's agreement itself is also not
dispositive of the issue in that defendants believe that a

-6-

careful reading 01 the declaration creates doubt as to exactly
what kinds cf activities are prohibited and at least raises a
factual dispute as to the interpretation of the agreement. The
operable language of paragraph seven states, in part,
"that all units are intended to be used
for residential housing are restricted to
such use. No units shall be used,
occupied or altered in violation of the
law so as to detract from the appearance
or value of any other unit or so as to
create a nuisance or to interfere with
the rights of any other unit owner or
in a way which would result in an
increased of any insurance covering the
project as a whole."
There is no specific prohibition against an in-home
business.

In the defendant Melehes' deposition, she testified

that in the particular unit in question she would sleep there and
use it as a residence, along with running her business.
Record on Appeal, Deposition of Melehes p.6.)

(See

It would appear

that the appropriate interpretation of this section would be that
whether or not this particular in-home business can be maintained
depends upon whether it violates the law or in some way
interferes with other owners use of the premises or detracts from
value.

There was no allegation at the time of the summary

judgment hearing that any municipal or county ordinance that had
been violated and there were no allegations that the operation
interfered with any others use or enjoyment of the premises or
that it created a nuisance.

The only allegation made by the

plaintiff was that the condominium project was covered by the
declaration and that that declaration, per se, prohibited a
in-home business. Again, this is a disputed issue which should
have been resolved in a trial on the merits.

Defendants strongly assert that there was before the court
insufficient evidentiary material to be able to rule that no
factual or legal dispute existed and grant the summary judgment.
In fact, the evidence that was before the court in the form of
depositional testimony, affidavits and the memorandum that were
submitted by both parties indicated that there were disputes
concerning agreements made between the defendant and the third
party developer as to the use of their unitf and secondly, the
dispute concerning the interpretation of the operable language of
the agreement as it applied to this particular situation. Given
the presence of both of these disputes areas, there is simply no
question that the court erred and abused it's discretion in
granting summary judgment and the court1s decision should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is not appropriate in this case.

The court

erred in finding such against the defendants as there were
genuine issues of fact that were in dispute based on the status
of the pleadings at the time.

The court is not allowed to infer

other facts which were not present.

The court overreached in

granting summary judgment and the defendants respectfully submits
that the decision of the lower court be reversed and the case be
allowed to proceed to trial on the/merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisj^^tTtay o2/)ctober, 198L^.

gkSHVl T. CAINE
Attorney for Defendants
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTRYSIDE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, a Utah
nonprofit corporation.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND INJUNCTION

Plaintiff,

Civil No.

JOHN MELEHES and IRIS
MELEHES,

C-85-1239

Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was submitted to
this Court on the basis of the record on July 2, 1985, by
Stipulation of Counsel appearing herein and upon acquiescence
of the .undersigned Court.
Based on the memoranda and pleadings on file herein, and
being duly advised in the premises, this Court hereby grants
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and hereby enjoins
defendants from any further conduct of business within those
condominium units in the Countryside Condominium complex, being
more particularly those two units located at 637 East 6910 South,

ADDENDUM

Salt Lake City, Utah, and the unit: located adjacent thereto
commonly referred to as the "office."
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

s-.1

day of August, 1985.

BY THE COURT:
A \« ~, I7 <^A-

' ' h i
JUDGE JOHN A .

ROKICH

ATTEST 1

H. DIXON H|NL">{ rY/

Deputy Uisrk
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